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LEGISLATION
AIDING AN ATTEMPTED ESCAPE
FROM FEDERAL CUSTODY
Chapter 331 of the 1956 Public Law 544 amends section 752 of title 18,
United States Code, by broadening section 752 so as to provide punishment for
persons who instigate, aid, or assist in the attempted escape of persons from
federal custody.'
Custody is defined as the imprisonment, detention, or continued control of
one after his arrest; and since no moral obligation can be recognized as a
substitute for it, the moment compulsion is withdrawn, custody ceases, not-
withstanding a promise to remain in custody.2 Arrest is the taking into custody
of one against his will and without his consent, under some real or assumed
authority, to prevent the commission of a crime, or to cause such person to be
brought before a competent public legal tribunal to answer a charge of com-
mitting or attempting to commit a crime, or as a protective measure, or to
otherwise aid the administration of justice.3 A person is in federal custody,
therefore, when arrested upon a warrant or other process issued under any law
of the United States, or when committed to the custody of the Attorney General
of the United States or to any institution by his direction; 4 and an escape
from, or an attempt to escape from, federal custody is forbidden by section 75 1r
of title 18 without mention of the propriety of the federal custody or confine-
1. "Whoever rescues or attempts to rescue or instigates, aids or assists the escape, or
attempt to escape, of any person arrested upon a warrant or other process issued under any
law of the United States, or committed to the custody of the Attorney General or to any
institution by his direction, shall, if the custody or confinement is by virtue of an arrest on
a charge of felony, or conviction of any offense, be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both; or, if the custody of confinement is for extradition or by
virtue of an arrest or charge of or for a misdemeanor, and prior to conviction, be fined not more
than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both." 18 U.S.C.A. § 752 (Supp. 1936).
2. Custody may be actual, as where there is a physical seizure; or constructive, as where
there is not, but may be, physical seizure, the person being subject to actual custody, as In
the case of one on parole, probation or suspended sentence, free to go within prescribed limits.
1 Alexander, The Law of Arrest § 45 (1949).
3. Detaining to examine or investigate one not yet accused of crime nor a material witness
was an arrest. Bennett v. United States, 104 F.2d 209, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1939). Officer telling
one he was from headquarters, where the inspector wanted to see him, and taking him in an
automobile, although with no actual notice of an intention to arrest was an arrest. Morton
v. United States, 147 F.2d 28, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
4. General supervision over a prisoner, performing assigned chores on a dock, outside the
prison walls, on an island on which the penitentiary was located, constitutes federal custody,
notwithstanding that the guard did not follow the prisoner around and keep him every mo-
ment under observation. Giles v. United States, 157 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1946). As to federal
custody, see Martin v. United States, 168 Fed. 198, 204 (8th Cir. 1909) ; People v. Maxwell,
125 F. Supp. 18, 22 (D. Colo. 1954); Payne v. United States, 85 F. Supp. 404 (M.D. Pa.
1949) ; Browder v. Cook, 59 F. Supp. 225, 231 (N.D. Idaho 1944).
5. 18 U.S.C.A. § 751 (1950).
LEGISLATION
ment,6 as is aiding an escape or an attempt to escape forbidden by section 752
-vithout such mention.
The federal courts have defined an escape as the voluntary regaining of one's
liberty from some imprisonment, restraint, or confinement, i.e., from custody.7
It appears that force or violence is not a necessary element of the crime of
escape.8 As to an attempt to escape, all that can be stated without doubt is
that at some point before an escape has been committed, an attempt to escape
has occurred, such attempt being criminal. However, no satisfactory general
statement as to just when this attempt occurs is possible.0 Possibly the yard-
stick best adapted to meet any general situation of attempts to escape was
propounded by justice Holmes in Commonwealth v. Kennedy in which he said:
"As the aim of the law is not to punish sins, but to prevent certain external
results, the act done must come pretty near to accomplishing that result before
the law will notice it.. .. Every question of proximity must be determined
by it own circumstances, and analogy is too imperfect to give much help." 10
To constitute an attempt, therefore, one's act must be more than merely
preparatory in character." The crime of instigating, aiding, or assisting an
attempted escape necessarily involves any overt act, intended and useful to
instigate, aid, or assist the actual attempt of the prisoner to escape by his
personal efforts,' 2 under such circumstances that the prisoner's criminal objec-
tive, escape, is apparently possible.'3
Until the enactment of the present amendment, the offense of instigating,
aiding, or assisting a person in an attempt to escape from federal custody was
never the subject of a specific statute. Former sections 753(h)14 and 753(i)lrj
6. "... [A] prisoner in a penal institution whose sentence is irregular or voidable may
not for that reason, and before some court has so adjudged, defy his guards and run away."
Aderhold v. Soileau, 67 F.2d 259, 260 (5th Cir. 1933). See also Bayless v. United States, 141
F.2d 578, 579 (9th Cir. 1944).
7. United States v. Davis, 167 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 849 (1943).
8. United States ex rel. Manzella v. Zimmerman, 71 F. Supp. 534, 537 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
9. The definition of an attempt as "... an act tending toward the accomplishment, and
<tone in part execution of the design to commit a crime, exceeding an intent but falling
:short of execution of it"' was held proper in Giles v. United States, 157 F2d 53, 590 (9th
Cir. 1946). Accord, Columbian Ins. Co. v. Modern Laundry, 277 Fed. 355, 359 (8th Cir.
1921).
10. 170 Mass. 18, 20-22, 43 N.E. 770, 770-71 (1897).
11. "... [Plreparations . . . although co-existent with a guilty intent, are indifferent in
their character, and do not advance the conduct of the party beyond the sphere of more
intent." United States v. Stephens. 12 Fed. 52, 55 (D.C. Ore. 1832). Acord, United States v.
One Trunk, 171 Fed. 772, 774 (S.D.N.Y. 1909). Cf. 1 Wharton, Criminal Law § 181 (12th
ed. 1932). The procurement by a prisoner from a visitor of tools adapted to jail breaing
has been held not to constitute an attempt to escape, being considered merely the procurement
-of the means of making the attempt, which was itself still in abeyance. State v. Hurley, 79
Vt. 28, 64 At. 78 (1906).
12. People v. Murphy, 130 Cal. App. 403, 20 P.2d 63 (1933); Merrill v. State, 42 Ariz.
-341, 26 P.2d 110 (1933); State v. Navarro, 131 Ale. 345, 163 At]. 103 (1932).
13. Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18, 43 N.E. 770 (1897).
14. 49 Stat. 13 (1935).
15. 4S Stat. 782 (1934).
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of title 18, the forerunners of sections 751 and 752 of title 18, made it an
offense for a federal prisoner to escape or attempt to escape and also an offense
to procure the escape of federal prisoners.
While section 752 had previously provided for the punishment of a person
who instigated, aided, or assisted in the escape of a person in federal custody,
there was no specific provision for the punishment of one who took such a part
in an attempted escape. As the law stood, in order to find a person punishable
for instigating, aiding, or assisting the attempted escape of a person in federal
custody, resort had to be made to both a specific and a general statute. Under
the specific statute, section 751, a person who escapes or attempts to escape
from federal custody is made punishable, while under the general statute,
section 2 of title 18,16 a person who aids, abets, or induces the commission of
an offense against the United States is made a principal. Thus a person in-
stigating, aiding, or assisting the attempted escape of a person in federal
custody was punishable as a principal under section 751 to the same extent as
the offense is now punishable under the specific statute.' 7
Although the avowed purpose of the present amendment was to "close a
loophole in the existing law,' 8 it can hardly be considered such, not having
actually done away with any heretofore existing opportunities of evasion of
the ends of justice. Nevertheless there is no doubt that the present amend-
ment does represent a definite administrative refinement of title 18 of the
United States Code, in rendering the offense in question punishable under a
specific statute.
EXTENDED COVERAGE AND INCREASED BENEFITS UNDER THE
FEDERAL SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
The Social Security Act as originally enacted had as its main purpose the
provision of limited protection for a worker and/or his family against loss of
income caused by his death or retirement.' This original purpose has endured
since the act's passage in 1935 with various modifications and changes. But
none of these, however, appear as liberal or far-reaching as the changes em-
bodied in the amendments of 1956.
These amendments 2 were deemed appropriate, not because the law lacked
a sound basis, but rather, because as it existed certain inadequacies had become
increasingly apparent. Congress, recognizing the need for improvement, en-
acted the current revisions which cover almost every facet of the Social Security
Act. Since any attempt to cover all these changes would require an extensive
writing, their treatment in the present paper will be confined to those amend-
16. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2 (1950).
17. See note 1 supra.
18. U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2459 (1956).
1. 42 U.S.C.A. § 402 (1952).
2. Pub. L. No. 880, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 101-03 (Aug. 1, 1956).
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merts of sufficient interest to major segments of the public as to warrant
individual attention.
Insurance Benefits for Children Disabled Before Age Eighteen
Prior to this amendment, 3 only the dependent child of an insured, retired or
deceased worker was entitled to receive insurance benefits under the act, and
then only provided such child was unmarried and was not yet eighteen years
of age. Payments to the child would cease if he died, married, was adopted,4
or reached the age of eighteen.3
Under the 1956 amendment, insurance benefits are available not only to
children under age eighteen, as in prior years, but also to those children over
18 who are under a disabilityO which began prior to the attainment of eighteen
years. In either case the child must still be dependent upon an insured, de-
ceased or retired worker. Furthermore, benefits to which a disabled child is
entitled do not cease, if begun before age eighteen, when he reaches that age
unless he is no longer under a disability.
Reduction of Retirement Age for Women
The minimum retirement age for working women before the enactment of
this amendment was sxty-five.7 Retirement at such an age often resulted in
cases of hardship and unnecessary suffering. A widow or wife of a retired
worker who had no dependent children under eighteen years of age had to wait
until she was sixty-five years of age before she could be entitled to social
security benefits.8 Under such circumstances a woman was often forced to
begin or continue working-usually at low pay scales because of her inexperience
and age-either to support herself or to supplement a retired husband's insur-
ance benefits.
Now, under a new amendment, women-whether they are workers' wives or
widows, may elect to receive limited benefits at the age of sixty-two. Those
-who so elect incur a penalty of having their monthly benefits permanently
reduced. This permanent reduction applies both to the working woman and
the wife of an individual who is presently receiving retirement benefitsP
It has been estimated that a working woman who elects to receive the re-
duced benefits at any age between sixty-two and sixty-five will have received
more money in the first fifteen years of benefit payments than she would have
3. Id. § 101.
4. ... . except for adoption by a stepparent, grandparent, aunt, or uncle subcequent to
the death of such fully or currently insured individual .. . Id. § 101(a).
5. 42 U.S.C.A. § 402(d) (1) (c) (1952).
6. "The term 'disability' means inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected
to result in death or to be of long-continued and indefinite duration." Pub. L. No. SS0, 84th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 103(a) (Aug. 1, 1956).
7. 42 U.S.C.A. § 416 (a) (1952).
S. Id. § 402 (b), (d), (e), (g).
9. See table depicting the reductions, in the case of a woman worker, in U.S. Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare, Social Security Administration, OASI-1956-2, Benefits for
women under the 1956 amendments to the social security law 3 (Aug. 1956).
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received had she waited to attain sixty-five before receiving benefits. However,
after the first fifteen years, the total sum acquired will be less where she elected
to receive at the earlier age than the total sum she would have received had she
waited till she attained age sixty-five.10 In the case of a wife of a retired
worker, the choice in taking earlier payments before she was formerly entitled
to so do will result in increased total payments for the first twelve years.'
There is no reduction, however, in the case of a widow or mother of an
insured worker who dies leaving no beneficiaries, provided in the latter case,
that such worker was furnishing at least half of his mother's support. Thus
either of these individuals may receive unreduced benefit payments at age
sixty-two.
Insurance Benefits for Disabled Individuals
This amendment entails by far the most radical departure from the scope
and purpose of the original act. The Social Security Law, as it existed prior to
this amendment,' 2 had no provision for paying benefits to individuals who be-
came disabled before attaining age sixty-five. This amendment is designed to
alleviate the hardship which results from the loss of income caused by a dis-
ability13 of a permanent nature.
In order to qualify for such benefits, a worker must have attained the age
of fifty and be a person who ". . . would have been a fully and currently
insured individual . . . had he attained retirement age . . . .,"4 provided also
that such worker ". . . had not less than twenty quarters of coverage during
the forty-quarter period ending with the quarter . . ."15 in which application
for benefits was filed. In addition to the disabled worker having social security
credit for five years of work in the ten years before the established beginning date
of his disability he must have had at least one and one half years of this coverage in
the three years immediately preceding that date.' 6
In addition to these prerequisites, the disability must have existed at least
six months after the claimant was eligible to submit an application for insurance
benefits.' 7 Thus a claimant who is over fifty and has filed an application for
benefits must wait six months after becoming disabled before he is entitled to
receive monthly benefits for each month beginning with the first month after
his waiting period. Notwithstanding this, no waiting period shall begin before
January 1, 1957. Consequently a fully eligible disabled worker may not receive
insurance benefits until July 1, 1957. The benefits to such a worker will ter-
10. Id. at 7.
11. Ibid.
12. Pub. L. No. 880, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. § 103(a) (Aug. 1, 1956).
13. See note 6 supra.
14. Pub. L. No. 880, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. § 103 (a) (Aug. 1, 1956).
15. Ibid.
16. U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Social Security Administra-
tion, OASI-1956-1, A brief report on the 1956 amendments to the social security law 3
(Aug. 1956).
17. Pub. L. No. 880, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 1, 1956).
[Vol. 25;
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minate with the month preceding the month in which his disability ceases, he
dies, or he attains the age of sixty-five.18
The persons drafting this amendment realized that there were disability
payments available to workers, at both the federal and state levels. In order
to avoid any duplication of benefits based on a worker's disability, Congress
provided for a reduction in benefits equal to the amount paid to the disabled
worker under some other governmental system.' 0
Extension of Coverage
When the Social Security Law was first enacted it covered only those people
who were employed in business and industry.- 3 By the amendments of 1950
and 1954 coverage under the law was extended to many areas of employment
including people self-employed in a trade or business, self-employed farmers
and farm workers, employees of state and local governments, employees of
nonprofit organizations, members of religious orders and, finally, household
workers. 1 Coverage was even extended to include in certain instances the
earnings of professional people like lawyers, doctors and dentists, provided
however, that such persons rendered their services as employees.-
Now, however, under the 1956 amendment, lawyers, dentists, osteopaths,
veterinarians, chiropractors, naturopaths and optometrists are all eligible to
participate in the government insurance program even though they are self-
employed. Participation is on a purely voluntary basis and any prior coverage
acquired by the individual for other work can be added to his account even
though he is now self-employed.
-2 4
A professional self-employed person may become insured as early as April 1,
1957 provided his net earnings were four hundred dollars or more in the years
1956 and 1957. Thus, such a person may retire at the end of March, 1958
if he has reached retirement age at that time.2-
The benefits available to the self-employed professional worker are the same
as those ordinarily available under social security. Consequently, if the insured
worker is a woman, she may retire at age sixty-two or if the worker is per-
manently disabled, benefits are available after age fifty.
Conclusion
The aforementioned amendments seem to fall into two separate categories.
In the first are the amendments which are merely extensions of the law, namely
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Social Security Administration,
OASI-35, Your Social Security 33 (Mlarch 1956).
21. Id. at 33-40.
22. Id. at 34.
23. Pub. L. No. SSO, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. § 104 (Aug. 1, 1956), amending, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 411 (c) (5) (1952).
24. U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Social Security Administration,
OASI-1956-5, The rights of lawyers, dentists, osteopaths, veterinarians, chiropractors, naturo-




the reductions of the retirement age for women and the extension of coverage
to the professional self-employed. Such amendments can hardly be considered
as departures from the original purpose of the law, for in effect they do nothing
more than make benefits available at an earlier age and to different classes of
workers respectively.
In the second category, Congress deviated from the established theme of old
age and survivors' benefits and enacted the provisions providing benefits to
disabled persons. It is submitted that while insurance against disability is in
many cases available from other federal and state as well as from non-govern-
mental sources many workers are not covered by any state or local compensa-
tion plan nor are they able to secure insurance from private companies. To
condemn the extension of such protection to these persons merely because other
protection is provided or available may well be to lose sight of the true mean-
ing of social security.
RECENT AMENDMENTS TO THE NEW YORK STATE PERSONAL
INCOME TAX LAW
The 1956 amendments to the New York tax law have produced many im-
portant changes in the personal income tax field. An analysis of the more
significant aspects of these changes is the contemplated scope of this article.
Exemptions and Deductions
The first category of amendments has been referred to as a body of "human-
izing" provisions, so called because their primary object is to afford the tax-
payer more liberal allowances in the computation of his tax.' In addition, this
group of amendments has the effect of substantially conforming New York
law to the comparable federal income tax provisions.
Exemptions
New York law for the first time provides an exemption of $400 to a tax-
payer who is blind, with an additional $400 allowance if the taxpayer's spouse
is blind and the husband and wife file a joint return. 2 Another innovation,
exemption wise, under New York law is an allowance of $400 if a taxpayer is
over 65 years of age, with an additional $400 exemption if the taxpayer's
spouse is over 65 and a joint return is filed 3 The amount of these exemptions
is reduced, however, by the amount by which the gross income of the taxpayer,
or the aggregate gross income of the husband and wife living together, whether
or not they file a joint return, exceeds $6,000. 4 If a husband and wife file sep-
arate returns either may take the allowable exemption, or the exemption may
1. Governor's Special Message to the Legislature, McKinney's Session Laws of Ncw York
1624-26 (1956).
2. N.Y. Tax Law § 362 (2-a).
3. N.Y. Tax Law § 362 (2-b). Under both federal and state tax laws a husband and wife
may file a joint return though one of them has earned no gross income during the taxable
year. N.Y. Tax Law § 367 (1) ; Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6013 (a).
4. N.Y. Tax Law § 362 (2-c).
[Vol. 25
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be divided between them. The federal law is similar with two exceptions:
under the Internal Revenue Code the amount of each allowable exemption is
$600, and there is no critical income figure beyond which the total amount of
the exemptions must be reduced.0
Deductions
The deductions allowed under New York personal income tax statutes for
medical expenses, not compensated for by insurance or otherwise, has been
increased by reducing the amount of nondeductible medical expenses from five
per cent to three per cent of the net income of a taxpayer earning up to $6,000.0
If net income exceeds $6,000, then three per cent of the first $6,000 plus five
per cent of the excess of $6,000 is nondeductible.7 Prior to the 1956 amend-
ment the nondeductible amount was a straight five per cent of the net income.
The maximum medical deduction has been increased from $1,500 to $2,500
where a husband and wife file a joint return, or where an individual who files
is the head of a family.8 For all other individual returns the maximum deduc-
tion has been raised from $750 to $1,500.0
Where a joint return is filed and either spouse is blind or over 65, or if an
individual who files is blind or over 65, the entire amount of medical expenses
is deductible up to the applicable maximum.' 0
The Internal Revenue Code's treatment of medical deductions differs in four
ways: (1) a straight three per cent of adjusted gross income is the non-
deductible medical expense;" (2) the maximum deduction is determined by
allowing a base maximum figure of $2,500 for each ordinary exemption (tax-
payer's wife, daughter, etc.) with the limitation that the maximum deduction
shall not exceed $5,000 if the taxpayer is single and not head of the household,
or $10,000 if the husband and wife file a joint return, or if the taxpayer is
single and the head of a household;'- (3) the entire cost of medical care within
the applicable maximum may be deducted only where the taxpayer, or, in the
case of a joint return, either spouse is over 65; 13 (4) federal law provides that
medicines and drugs are considered medical expenses only to the extent that
their cost exceeds one per cent of adjusted gross income.1 4 Both the New York
and the federal provisions now regard the cost of transportation, provided it
can be shown to be primarily for and essential to medical care, a deductible
medical expenseY5
5. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 151(c) (exemption for over 65); § 151(d) (exemption for
blindness). Both the federal and state provisions use the same definition of blindnecs.





11. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 213(a) (1).
12. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 213(c).
13. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §213 (a) (2).
14. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 213(b). The New York law makes no such qualification.
See N.Y. Tax Law § 360(15).
15. N.Y. Tax Law § 360(15); Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 213(e) (1) (b).
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The New York tax law now allows a woman or widower to deduct the ex-
penses for the care of one receiving his support from the taxpayer so that the
taxpayer may be gainfully employed. 16 The statute provides a maximum de-
duction of $400 for any one dependent with a maximum deduction of $800 for
all dependents. 17 The federal provision allows a flat exemption of $600.18
Under the New York law the amount of the exemption is reduced by the
amount by which the taxpayer's gross income exceeds $6,000.10 Under the
federal law the critical income figure is an adjusted gross income of $4,500.
Both federal and state law include in the definition of widower one who is
legally separated or divorced from his wife.20 Similarly, while under both laws
a married woman is not allowed the deduction unless she files a joint return
with her husband, a woman is regarded as being unmarried if she is legally
separated from her husband under a decree of divorce or separate mainte-
nance.2 1 Both statutes disallow a deduction for payments made to a person
who is dependent upon and receiving his chief support from the taxpayer. 22
Alimony and Separate Maintenance Payments
Formerly, under New York law, payments made to a wife as alimony or for
separate maintenance were includible in her gross income, and deductible from
the husband's gross income, only if they were made under a decree of divorce
or separate maintenance.2 3 The same rule was applicable to the income of a
trust set up for the purpose of providing payments for alimony or separate
maintenance.2 4 The 1956 amendments, again conforming to federal law," pro-
vide that payments made to a wife, who is separated from her husband, under
a written, executed separation agreement or under a decree providing for the
wife's support and maintenance will be included in the wife's gross income and
not the husband's. 26 Under both federal and state law the amendments are
inapplicable where the husband and wife file a joint return. 27 There may be
situations in which the filing of a joint return will be more advantageous to the
husband than shifting the amount of payments under a separation agreement
or a support decree to the wife's gross income. It is advisable, therefore, that
lawyers when negotiating on behalf of the husband, attempt to obviate such
16. N.Y. Tax Law § 360 (16-a).
17. Ibid.
18. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 214(b) (1) (A).
19. N.Y. Tax Law § 360 (16-a).
20. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 214(c) (2); N.Y. Tax Law § 360 (16-a).
21. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 214(c) (3) ; N.Y. Tax Law § 360 (16-a).
22. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 214(b) (1) (B); N.Y. Tax Law § 360 (16-a).
23. N.Y. Tax Law § 359(8) (1943).
24. N.Y. Tax Law § 365(8) (1943).
25. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 71 (alimony payments) ; § 682 (income of a trust in case
of divorce).
26. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1956, c. 360. See, Memo. of the State Dep't of Taxation and Finance,
McKinney's Session Laws of New York 1863-64 (1956), for comments on the effect of the
various sections of c. 360.
27. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 71; N.Y. Tax Law § 359(8).
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a contingent tax disadvantage by providing in the agreement that the husband in
such an event may utilize the income-splitting benefits of a joint return.
Definitions and Computations
Chapter 629 of the New York Laws of 1956 may be described as an "omnibus
provision" relating to the reporting and computation of income taxes. Its sub-
divisions modify disparate sections of the New York tax law, and its effect on
each must be considered separately.
Definition of Fiscal Year
Certain businesses frequently have their annual accounting period end on a
particular day of the week, rather than at the end of the month. This practice
results in having a fifty-two week accounting period in some years and a fifty-
three week period in others. To accommodate such an accounting practice New
York law now provides that the term "fiscal year" shall include such fifty-two
or fifty-three week periods for personal income tax purposes, provided that the
particular day on which the accounting period always ends is the last such day
nearest the end of the calendar month.28 To enable the ascertainment of the
tax rates, the time for filing returns, and the other related matters, the account-
ing period is considered as the commencement of a "fiscal year" from the first
day of the calendar month in which the accounting period begins, and is deemed
the close of a "fiscal year" from the last day of the calendar month in which
the accounting period comes to an end.20 This conforms to federal lawY'P Both
federal and state law provide for a "short return" to be filed if the change is
made from a calendar year or fiscal year ending on the last day of the monthP31
However, where the period between the close of the former taxable year and
the date designated as the end of the new taxable year is less than seven days,
the short period becomes part of the following taxable year-2
Donee's Basis Where Property Is Included in Donor's Estate
For the purpose of ascertaining capital gains or losses, the New York tax
law provides that the "cost" of property acquired by a taxpayer by bequest,
devise or inheritance is the fair market value of the property at the time of
decedent's death.3 A 1956 amendment broadens the concept of the phrase,
"acquired by bequest, devise or inheritance," to encompass property included
in the decedent's estate by reason of the decedent's death, the form of owner-
ship or other conditions, e.g., gifts in contemplation of death and joint tenan-
cies. The effect of the amendment is to eliminate a double standard of basis
28. N.Y. Tax Law § 350(4). See, Memo. of the State Dep't of Taxation and Finance,
McKinney's Session Laws of New York 1907-09 (1956), for comments on the effect of the
various sections of c. 629.
29. N.Y. Tax Law § 350(4).
30. bI.n Rev. Code of 1954, § 441(f).
31. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 443; N.Y. Tax Law § 370.
32. It. Rev. Code of 1954, § 441(f) (2) ; N.Y. Tax Law § 370.
33. N.Y. Tax Law § 353 (6).
34. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1956, c. 629, § 2.
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or "cost" for the acquired property. Formerly the donee's basis for property
subsequently included in the decedent-donor's estate as having been given in
contemplation of death was the value of the property at the time the gift was
made. Under the present amendment the donee's basis is the same as the
decedent's, namely, the value at the decedent's death. The amendment con-
forms to the federal provision, which is applicable to situations where the
decedent died after December 31, 1953.3 The New York statute makes no
stipulation as to the time after which the decedent must have died for the
provision to have effect. Both the state and federal statutes provide that the
value of any property which the taxpayer may have received prior to the
decedent's death shall be reduced by the amount allowed to the taxpayer in
computing taxable income for amortization, wear, exhaustion and so forth with
respect to the property before the decedent's death.30
Sale of Principal Residence by the Taxpayer
If the taxpayer sells his old residence, i.e., his principal place of residence, and
within six months prior to or after such sale he purchases a new residence, New
York law now provides that a capital gain will be recognized only to the extent
that the cost of the new residence exceeds the "adjusted sales price" of the old
residence.3 7 The term, "adjusted sales price," is defined as the amount realized
on the sale of the old residence reduced by the amount the taxpayer expended for
work performed on the residence to assist in its sale within ninety days prior
to the execution of the contract to sell, provided the amount expended was paid
within thirty days after the sale.2 8 The gain realized but not recognized is
deducted from the cost of the new residence to give an adjusted basis.89 The
statute conforms to federal law except that under the Internal Revenue Code
the new residence may be acquired within one year before or after the sale of
the old residence.40
Employee's Death Benefits
New York tax law formerly exempted from gross income amounts received
by beneficiaries from the decedent's employer or employers up to $5,000 for
each employer.4 1 The 1956 amendment makes the aggregate exclusion $5,000. 4 2
In further conformity with the federal provision 43 the amendment precludes
exclusion of amounts over which the employee possessed before his death a non-
forfeitable right to receive while living.44 The statute excepts from the term
"nonforfeitable right" distributions payable to a distributee on account of the
35. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1014(b) (9).
36. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1014(b) (9) ; N.Y. Tax Law § 353(6).
37. N.Y. Tax Law § 354-a(1).
38. Ibid.
39. N.Y. Tax Law §354-a(1).
40. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1034.
41. N.Y. Tax Law §359(a) (1953).
42. N.Y. Tax Law § 359(a).
43. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 101(b).
44. N.Y. Tax Law § 359(a).
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employee's death or separation from employment, or on account of the em-
ployee's death after separation from employment under a qualified stock bonus,
pension or profit sharing annuity,45 providing the payment is made within one
taxable year to the distributee and on account of the employee's death. 40
Conclusion
The preceding recital indicates that the effect of the 1956 amendments to the
New York personal income tax provisions has had the effect of conforming those
provisions with the comparable sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
However, the more important effect of these amendments has been to make
New York tax law more just and equitable. Due recognition, and consequent
relief, has been given to situations where hardship required it or where experi-
ence had shown the superseded statutes to be inadequate.
SUAIMARY DISPOSAL OF PROTESTS TO FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Chapter 1 of 1956 Public Law 391 amends section 309 (c) of the Com-
munications Act of 19341 so as to make clear that the Federal Communications
Commission has the authority to dispose of protests to its grants of authoriza-
tion to operate radio and television stations without holding a full evidentiary
hearing.2
The Federal Communications Commission, as an administrative organization,
requires under the Communications Act of 1934 that licenses must be secured
by all radio and television operators. 3 The standard established by the Com-
mission in granting these licenses is the "... public interest, convenience, and
necessity."14 The Commission is regarded " . . as a kind of traffic officer,
policing the wave lengths to prevent stations from interfering with each other."3
The rules and regulations, including those pertaining to the issuance of licenses
to station operators, must necessarily be administered in accordance with the
Communications Act.6 If the Commission abuses its powers in the administra-
tion of its functions, it is subject, as are other governmental administrative
45. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 401-04.
46. N.Y. Tax Law § 359(a).
1. 47 U.S.C-A. § 309 (c) (Supp. 1956).
2. "When any instrument of authorization is granted by the Commission without a hear-
ing.... The Commission shall, within thirty days of the filing of the protest, render a
decision making findings as to the sufficiency of the protest... and, where it so finds, shall
designate the application for hearing ... except with respect to such matters as to which
the Commission, after affording protestant an opportunity for oral argument, finds, for
reasons set forth in the decision, that, even if the facts alleged were to be proven, no grounds
for setting aside the grant are presented." Ibid.
3. 47 U.S.C.A. § 301 (Supp. 1956).
4. 47 U.S.C.A. § 309 (a) (Supp. 1956).
S. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215 (1943).
6. 47 U.S.CA. § 303 (Supp. 1956).
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agencies, to having its orders and decisions reversed through judicial review
by the federal courts. 7
In 1952, section 309(c) was enacted as a part of the Communications Act
amendments. Its purpose was to guarantee to a "party in interest" an oppor-
tunity to protest where action was taken by the Federal Communications Com-
mission without a prior chance for such party to voice opposition to a grant
of authorization. 9 If the "party in interest" should set forth the facts relied
upon in his protest with particularity, a serious question arose. In such a situa-
tion it appeared that the Commission had no choice but to designate the
license application for a full evidentiary hearing regardless of the issues raised
by the protest.'0
The result of the 1952 amendment was that, pending the outcome of the pro-
test hearing, the public was needlessly deprived for a prolonged period of time
of a new radio or television service. The Commission was required, except when
the continuance of an existing service was concerned, to stay the effectiveness
of any protested grant until final decision was rendered by the Commission on
the protest after a full evidentiary hearing." This held true even where there
was a public need for the service in question, and little or no probability existed
that there would be any basis shown for setting aside the grant.1 -' The Com-
mission was given no discretion to consider whether the public interest required
the grant to remain in effect.' 3
Under this section, as newly amended, evidentiary hearings based on protests
of grants by the Commission would be eliminated if the facts alleged, albeit
proven true, would not constitute grounds for setting aside the grant. Thus, the
Commission can demur to any or all issues which are raised in the protest, a
method analogous to a court's power to dispose by summary judgment.' 4 Fur-
thermore, under the new amendment the protested grant will remain in effect
where a hearing is necessary if the Commission affirmatively finds that the pub-
lic interest so requires and sets forth reasons for determination of the decision. 15
In addition, the amendment clarifies the power of the Commission to redraft
issues. Therefore, where the protestant's issues are too broadly drawn or in-
clude material not covered by the facts relied upon, the Commission has author-
7. 47 U.S.C.A. § 402 (a), (b) (Supp. 1956).
8. A newspaper publisher with no radio or television interests is deemed a "party in In-
terest" with standing to protest a grant of permit for television or radio construction. Clarks-
burg Publishing Co. v. FCC, 225 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1955). A person with an option to buy
a radio station from an owner and to obtain assignment of its license is a "party in Interest."
Granik v. FCC, 234 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
9. Prior to the 1952 amendment, the remedy available to a party whose interests were ad-
versly affected by a grant made without hearing was to file an application for rehearing
under section 405 of the act. 47 U.S.C.A. § 405 (Supp. 1956).
10. Clarksburg Publishing Co. v. FCC, 225 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
11. 47 U.S.C.A. § 309 (c) (Supp. 1956).
12. U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 466 (1956).
is. Ibid.
14. Id. at 467.
15. Pub. L. No. 391, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 20, 1956).
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ity to redraft the issues to reflect accurately the substantive matters in the
protest.16
The original section points out that a "party in interest" may file a protest. 17
Under the amendment this is still the law. The term "party in interest" en-
compasses a wide variety of persons18 though basically a person is so deemed
if he is aggrieved or his interests are adversely affected by the grant of
authorization.' 9
A protest of grant must ,. . . specify with particularity the facts relied
upon . . ." by the protestant.20 This requires that the protestant merely set
forth an articulated statement of some fact or circumstance which would tend
to show, if established at the hearing, that the grant of the license contravened
public interest, convenience and necessity, or that the licensee was technically
or financially unqualified, contrary to the Commission's initial finding? 1
Prior to the present amendment, the section provided that the application,
if made by a "party in interest" as required by the act, and if it also met the
test of particularity set forth therein, should be set for hearing upon the issues
propounded in the protest, together with such further specific issues as may be
prescribed by the Commission. -2 The statute contemplated that, ".. in
appropriate cases, the Commission's inquiry would extend beyond matters
alleged in the protest in order to reach any issue which may be relevant in
determining the legality of the challenged grant."2 3 The inquiry could not be
".. . limited to the facts alleged in the protest where the Commission has
reason to believe. . . that a full evidentiary hearing may develop other relevant
information not in the possession of the protestant."' 4 This power has now
been extended and clarified by the new provision of the section permitting the
Commission to redraft the issues urged by the protestant so as to conform to
the substantive matters alleged in the protest.
Thus the revised language of the section enables interested parties to bring
to the attention of the Commission questions concerning grants made without
hearings2 6 while at the same time avoiding the utilization of the protest rule
16. Ibid.
17. 47 U.S.C.A. § 309 (c) (Supp. 1956).
1S. See note 8 supra.
19. Metropolitan Television Co. v. FCC, 221 F.2d 379, SSO (D.C. Cir. 1955); Camden
Radio Inc. v. FCC, 220 F.2d 191, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
20. 47 uTh.C.A. § 309 (c) (Supp. 1956).
21. Federal Broadcasting System v. FCC, 225 F.2d 560, 563 (D.C. Cir. 195s).
22. 47 U.S.CA. § 309 (c) (Supp. 1956).
23. Clarksburg Publishing Co. v. FCC, 225 F.2d 511, 515 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
24. Ibid.
25. Pub. L. No. 391, S4th Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 20, 1956).
26. Ibid. "When any instrument of authorization is granted by the Commislon without
a hearing... such grant shall remain subject to protest ... for a period of thirty days.
During such thirty-day period any party in interest may file a protest under oath directed to
such grant and request a hearing on said application so granted. Any protest co fled shall
be served on the grantee, shall contain such allegations of fact as will show the protestant
to be a party in interest, and shall specify with particularity the facts relied upon by the
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as a procedural device to keep a competitive radio or television service off the
air. Therefore, under the new rule many substantial delays hitherto encountered
in the construction and operation of new television or radio stations authorized
by the Commission without hearings will be avoided. The results of the amend-
ment are wholly salutary in that the act has been revised so as to clarify the
powers of the Federal Communications Commission in handling the matter of
protests, and to curb the possible abuses of the protest procedure to effect
dilatory ends.
TAXATION OF LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES
During the period of the modern income tax in the United States it has been
difficult to establish a satisfactory and equitable basis for taxing the income of
life insurance companies. This is primarily due to the nature of the insurance
business inasmuch as it is essentially a business of variables. Before the present
law, the formula for determining federal income taxes for life insurance com-
panies had been changed five times.' Two of these changes, in 1942 and 1950,
were made necessary because under the previous formulas it was believed dis-
proportionately low taxes were being paid by all or most of the insurance
companies. 2 In 1947 and 1948 the formula in effect had resulted in almost no
income tax being paid. 3 For a number of years the Treasury Department, Con-
gress and the life insurance companies have been studying the problem of a
fair and permanent income tax. In this connection, the Secretary of the
Treasury has urged that an attempt be made to develop a method of taxing
life insurance companies, as are other businesses, on the basis of their expenses
and additions to their reserves against policy contracts.4 On March 13, 1956,
Congress passed Public Law 429 which provided for a tax formula for 1955.5
This formula was later extended to apply to tax years beginning in 1956 as well.0
It is especially significant legislation since it is estimated that the tax imposed for
the calendar year 1955 will yield some $51 million in additional revenue. 7
It is not the purpose of this paper to delve into the intricacies of the actuarial
profession, but the provisions of the Code which govern the taxation of life
insurance companies cannot be considered intelligently except in the light of the
protestant as showing that the grant was improperly made or would otherwise not be in
the public interest."
1. Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee on the
Federal Taxation of Life Insurance Companies, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1954).
2. Ibid. See also H.R. Rep. No. 1522, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1950).
3. Hearings, supra note 1; 2 P-H 1956 Fed. Tax Serv. ff 16027-A.
4. U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1056 (1956).
5. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 801-05, 68A Stat. 255, as amended, Pub. L. No. 429, 84th
Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 801-05, 811-13 (March 13, 1956). These sections provided for a 1955
stopgap tax formula and a tentative formula for 1956 and later years.
6. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 801-05, 68A Stat. 255, as amended, Pub. L. No. 784, 84th
Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 801-05, 811-13 (July 24, 1956).
7. U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1057 (1956).
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distinguishing characteristics of life insurance. Generally, life insurance policies
involve a pure insurance element and a savings element in varying degrees of
importance.8 In considering the former, for example, life insurance can be
issued where the cost of the premium covers only the cost of protection for a
specified term of years. When it is sold on that basis it is called "term" insur-
ance9 and there is no maturity value, no cash surrender value and no insurance
coverage after the term expiresY' The premium is the amount the insured must
pay, and is determined by a consideration of a group of similar policies all
issued in the same year to men of the same age, coupled with indications from
the mortality tables forecasting the mortality rate for each year. Agent's com-
missions and administrative expenses are added to this calculated figure for a
final determination of what the insured must pay annually. Actual mortality
may be more or less than the tabular mortality and the expenses to the company
could, of course, be greater or less than anticipated."
Ordinary life insurance differs from term insurance only in that it is a contract
of insurance issued for a fixed premium with a sum certain to be paid on death.
The company realizes that the event insured against is certain to occur, sooner
or later, and the probability of its occurrence in any year for which a premium
is paid increases with each year of the insured's life.Y' Life insurance, therefore,
calls for an annual premium which, during the earlier years of a policy, provides
not only the cost of protection for that year but also an amount to be invested
and accumulated at interest to provide for protection in future years. This fact
is dearly apparent in still another type of coverage, the endowment policy,
where the company promises to pay a sum certain to the insured if he survives
a certain period of time or, if he dies before that time, to the named beneficiary.
It is an investment as well as life insurance for the insured.' 3
From the nature of the life insurance business it is self-evident that profits,
if any, must be retained to some extent in the company, partly to meet future
contingencies on profit-producing policies as well as to finance new underwriting.
The investment fund, generally called the reserve on the policy, is the basic life
insurance reserve and its function has been described as follows: ". . death
is sure to occur eventually and death, therefore, as such, cannot be insured
against. It can be provided for. That is, the risk insured against is the pos-
sibility of death, at some particular time. A company can insure against the
chance of dying within one year, for instance, but if it agrees to pay $1,000 a
death whenever it may occur, it really must provide two funds, one against
premature death and one to provide for the certainty of death at an advanced
age."-4 Moreover, there are other reserves which a life insurance company is
S. Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee on the
Federal Taxation of Life Insurance Companies, 33rd Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1954).
9. 8 Mertens, Federal Income Taxation § 44.16 (1942).
10. Hearings, supra note S.
11. Ibid.
12. 8 Mertens, Federal Income Taxation § 44.16 (1942).
13. Ibid.
14. Huebner, Life Insurance 222 (1935 ed.), as found in 8 Mertens, Federal Income
Taxation 40 n.53 (1942).
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required to maintain. Many policies provide additional benefits for which extra
premiums are charged, such as disability income benefits, waiver of premiums
in the event the insured becomes totally or permanently disabled and an extra
death benefit in case of accidental death. The policies of a mutual company
permit the policyholder to leave dividends on deposit with the company to
accumulate at interest until withdrawn in cash or, at the option of the policy-
holder, to be applied to premiums or to the purchase of additional insurance
under the original policy. Practically all life insurance policies provide optional
modes of settlement which may be elected in lieu of lump sum payments. These
optional settlements, called "Supplementary Contracts," require the company to
hold the face amounts of the policies after the dates upon which they would
otherwise be payable, supplement these amounts with interest, and pay out the
increased amounts in installments, or otherwise, over varying periods of time.
The company is required to maintain a separate reserve for its liabilities under
each of the above provisions. Common to all life insurance reserves is that they
must be maintained at interest. 15
As a general rule, life insurance companies derive no profit from premium
receipts. Their profit is derived from investments, and a substantial portion of
the income from investments is needed for reserves. The reserve cannot be
deemed a true profit because it is held as a trust fund to meet the claims of
policyholders. It is represented by assets which the company invests but is, in
fact, a company liability subject to the obligations of the policy contract.,,
Moreover, most life insurance is written on a participating basis which requires
the company to return to the policyholder in "dividends" any earnings avail-
able for distribution.'
7
Prior to 1921, life insurance companies were taxed under the general provi-
sions applicable to ordinary corporations. Premiums in general, investment
income and capital gains were included in gross income. Dividends, except
those used to reduce current premiums, were regarded as a distribution of invest-
ment income properly taxable to the company, despite its mutual character.
Customary corporate deductions were allowed the life insurance company. In
addition to underwriting and investment expenses there were allowed as deduc-
tions those sums paid within the taxable year on policy and annuity contracts
as well as the net addition required by law to be made to the reserve funds.
Although premiums were included as gross income, such part of each premium
as was credited to the policyholder by way of a credit to a reserve was deducted.
Also included in gross income was investment income, but that part which was,
in effect, credited to policyholders as interest on the reserves was deducted.18
The inclusion of premium receipts in the gross taxable income of life insurance
companies was recognized at that time as "one of the faultiest parts of the
15. 8 Mertens, Federal Income Taxation § 44.27 (1942).
16. Magee, Life Insurance 429-30 (rev. ed. 1951).
17. Vance, Law of Insurance § 91, at 548-51 (3d ed. 1951).
18. Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee on the
Federal Taxation of Life Insurance Companies, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1954).
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income tax act."' 9 This feeling was based on the fact that life insurance
premiums constitute, basically, contributions to capital.
Realizing this defect, the intent of the law became to tax "net" investment
income only, after allowing for amounts set aside in reserves for policyholders.
Underwriting income (income arising because actual mortality or expenses were
less than forecast) and policyholder dividends, from 1921 on, were not con-
sidered in determining the tax. In 1921, investment income, by specific defini-
tion, included only interest, dividends and rents. In recommending this new
basis for the taxation of life insurance companies, Dr. T. S. Adams, Tax Adviser
of the Treasury Department, advised the Senate Finance Committee: "Under
the present law the premiums paid by a life insurance policyholder are deemed
to be actual income by the life insurance company. . . . It has been suggested
. .. that the only basis of income of a life insurance company is its investment
income. . . .The premium payments it gets are a good deal like a bank deposit.
When it takes them over, it creates an obligation such as the obligation of a
bank to return a deposit when it is called for."20 Deductions designed to exempt
from the tax that part of this investment income which the companies must
apply to their policy obligations and deductions for taxes, depreciation and
expenses were allowed.2 '
From 1921 through 1941, the deduction for interest credited to policy reserves
was at the minimum of 34 per cent of the mean of the reserve funds in addi-
tion to exempt interest.2 Shortly after 1932, because of the drastic decline in
the rate of interest which companies were able to earn on their invested assets,
the tax revenue produced by this law was reduced almost to the vanishing
point.P As a result, the law relating to the taxation of life insurance companies
was amended again in 1942.24 The purpose of this legislation was to reduce the
allowable deductions and to tax on an industry-wide basis a specified portion,
varying year by year, of the investment income of each life insurance company.
This computation was commonly called the "Secretary's Ratio." The rate of
return on invested funds of life insurance companies continued to decline and
in 1947 the allowable deductions exceeded 100 per cent of the taxable income
with the result that no life insurance company was required to pay a tax on its
life insurance business. 25
Gravely concerned over the vanishing of the tax on life insurance companies,
Congress adopted a "stopgap" in 1950 reducing exemptions.2 0 From 1951
through 1954 this "stopgap" formula was in use. It applied a low rate tax to the
"life insurance company taxable income" without the allowance of any "reserve
19. Hearings Before the Senate Finance Committee on H.R. 8245, 67th Cong,, Pit Se S.
83 (1921).
20. Ibid.
21. Hearings, supra note 18, at 19.
22. Ibid.
23. Vichrey, Insurance Under the Federal Income Tax, 52 Yale L.J. 54, 576 (1943).
24. 2 P-H 1956 Fed. Tax Serv. 16027-A.
25. H.R. Rep. No. 1522, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1950).
26. Revenue Act of 1950 §§ 401-02, 64 Stat. 906.
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and other policy liability credit," allowance of the latter having been the reason
for the vanishing tax. For 1954 life insurance companies were taxed at regular
corporate rates after deducting 872 per cent of the net investment income.
27
In enacting the new bill Congress was faced with many problems. As previ-
ously noted, the funds handled by life insurance companies arise from two
quite distinct sources, premiums received and investment income. This situa-
tion coupled with the presence of both a savings element and a pure insurance
element to a substantial degree creates the problem of "What should be con-
sidered the income of life insurance companies for tax purposes?" Any measure-
ment of taxable income attributable to the underwriting aspect of the business
would be complicated fundamentally by the long term nature of the business.
The measurement of the net investment income on the savings element alone is
complicated by the commitments of the companies to add a large part of this
income to the reserves. Congress also had to consider the fact that a tax levied
on a life insurance company will be borne largely by the policyholders. More-
over, an insurance company must estimate federal taxes for a long period in
the future in making life insurance contracts. A sudden and large change in the
tax would necessarily effect the value of the contracts already in force. Also,
state taxes have become heavy 28 and an overburdensome federal tax might put
domestic companies at a disadvantage as to foreign life insurance companies.
In this respect, it has been argued that since life insurance is the only form
of individual savings subjected to such local taxes, they should be taken into
account in determining the relative burden of any income tax imposed at the
federal level. It must be remembered that most life insurance business in the
United States is written by mutual companies and that companies other than
life insurance mutual companies receive special relief. Furthermore, it is uni-
versally recognized that life insurance has an important place in the American
economy which should be encouraged as a means of relieving the potential
burden on government for the support of widows and other dependents. Public
service in reducing pauperism and encouraging thrift cannot be overlooked,
especially where the obligations for support would normally fall on society as a
whole. This makes it of prime importance that the tax shall in no way under-
mine the soundness of the companies or unreasonably impair their growth.
On the other hand, life insurance companies are actually engaged in several
different types of activities, some of which constitute the major enterprises of
companies not taxed as life insurance companies. For example, they carry on
an important portion of the health and accident business attributed to casualty
companies which, in turn, are taxed quite differently. The term insurance,
individual annuity and group annuity aspects are distinct in character from the
ordinary types of life insurance.29 The difficulty here is finding a tax which
will take into account the differences of character of income derived from these
diverse types of activities within the life insurance area on the one hand, and
27. Hearings, supra note 18, at 21-22; 2 P-H 1956 Fed. Tax Serv. f 16001-A.
28. Vance, Law of Insurance § 9 n.1 (3d ed. 1951).
29. Hearings, supra note 18, at 13-14.
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on the other hand to still take into account the competition in these fields which
exists between life insurance companies and those outside this tax area.
The new law for the most part contains substantial improvements over the
1954 provisions. It continues to disregard underwriting gains and losses in the
determination of taxable income, because of the difficulties of taxing insurance
companies on the regular corporate basis. However, the methods of dealing with
investment income, the taxation of income from non-life insurance business and
reserve deductions are considerably changed.
The new system in effect for 1955 and 1956 taxes life insurance companies at
regular corporate rates as did the previous law.c° It provides a deduction of
87Y2 per cent of the first $1 million of net investment income allocable to the
regular life insurance business and a deduction of 85 per cent on the amount in
excess thereof.31 After subtracting $1 million, this leaves 2% per cent more
taxable income than in 1954. The reason for this smaller deduction must be
attributed in part to Congress' thinking that the industry currently needs less
than 85 per cent of its net investment income to fulfill policy obligations.
Furthermore, this smaller deduction is due in some degree to the fact that in
recent years companies have transferred considerable amounts of surplus to
reserves in a process known as "reserve strengthening."- While this reduces
the current need for interest additions to reserves, it is not desirable that tax
liability should depend upon pure accounting methods of reserving.
In addition, the bill provides that stock and mutual companies that have
non-life insurance reserves will be taxed on the income from non-life insurance
business as though it was the income of a mutual casualty company. They will
pay the higher of either the tax at regular corporate rates on the net investment
income from non-life insurance business, or a tax of one per cent on the gross
investment income from that business plus premiums (less dividends) on those
policies3 3 Stock companies are predominate in the casualty field and were
taxed at a higher rate than the mutuals. Therefore, this portion of the bill
equalizes the treatment of stock and mutual companies in their non-life insur-
ance business in order to avoid the consequences of unfair competition. The
investment income attributable to the non-life insurance business is deemed that
part of the total net investment income which corresponds to the ratio of
reserves for unearned premiums and unpaid losses on non-life insurance busi-
ness to the total reserves. 34
The gross income of a life insurance company under the prior law was defined
as interest, dividends, and rents. This new law adds to this definition of gross
30. it. Rev. Code of 1954, § 802, 63A Stat. 255, as amended, Pub. L. No. 429, 84th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 802 (Mlarch 13, 1956).
31. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § S04(a), 68A Stat. 258, as amended, Pub. L. No. 429, 84th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 804(a) (March 13, 1956).
32. U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1059 (1956).
33. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 802(a), (c), 68A Stat. 2S6, as amended, Pub. L. No. 429,
84th Cong., 2d Sess. § 802(a), (c) (Mfarch 13, 1956).
34. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 804(d), 68A Stat. 258, as amended, Pub. L. No. 429, 4th
Cong., 2d Sess. § S04(d) (March 13, 1956).
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income royalties, certain amounts received in connection with altering or termi-
nating agreements such as leases and mortgages, and income derived from the
operation of non-life insurance business. Deductions corresponding to income
are allowed plus depletion and ordinary expenses of non-insurance business.3
Several other changes are made that are designed to prevent abuses of the
special tax treatment permitted to life insurance companies. Under the prior
law an insurance company was a "life insurance company" if more than 50 per
cent of its reserves were life insurance reserves. This rule is continued but
modified. Since previously it was possible for a company finding its reserves
other than life insurance reserves (generally accident and health insurance
reserves) rising over the 50 per cent to avoid taxation as a casualty com-
pany by "manufacturing" life insurance reserves through the device of selling
insurance policies and extending policy loans to the amount of the reserves set
up on these policies. This was a paper transaction to disguise the true character
of the company. The new law prevents such a practice by removing the amount
of policy loans from both life reserves and total reserves and then applying the
50 per cent requirement as though those loan transactions never occurred.30
A further corrective measure is the imposition of an over-all ceiling upon the
reserve and other policy liability deduction. This deduction serves in lieu of a
deduction for the actual commitment of each company to pay an accrued
interest. If, on the basis of commitments, the investment income is far greater
than necessary, instead of deducting 85 per cent of the large investment income,
a ceiling for the deduction is imposed. It is approximately 200 per cent of the
interest requirements on life insurance reserves plus the actual interest commit-
ments on contracts not involving life contingencies, plus dividends to policy-
holders.37 The ceiling, therefore, precludes a company from taking a deduction
far in excess of its actual commitments. In the computation the interest on life
insurance reserves matched by policy loans may be taken at only 100 per cent
and not 200 per cent.38 The purpose of this provision is to further deter the
creation of fictitious life insurance reserves by selling insurance policies where
a policy loan is extended immediately for almost the full amount of the premium.
All in all, the new tax law takes a long step in correcting abuses which have
existed for many years. Moreover the tax as such is effectively higher. Though
there is some question as to whether it is high enough, since most of the com-
panies are mutual companies and not great profit making organizations, special
relief should be given and the extra 23/ per cent of the investment income now
taxable will be borne by the policyholder. In the long run the added tax may
be a 'loss to the government rather than a gain to the extent the public would
be discouraged from obtaining private insurance protection.
35. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 803(b), 68A Stat. 256, as amended, Pub. L. No. 429, 84th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 803(b) (March 13, 1956).
36. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 801(b), (d), 68A Stat. 255, as amended, Pub. L. No. 429,
84th Cong., 2d Sess. § 801(b), (d) (March 13, 1956).
37. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 804(b), 68A Stat. 258, as amended, Pub. L. No. 429, 84th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 804(b) (March 13, 1956).
38. Ibid.
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Furthermore, many controversies arose in years past as to whether a specific
amount treated in the accounts of a life insurance company as a reserve was a
"reserve" within the meaning of the law. These questions have been answered
by court decisions. The effect is that these decisions have limited "reserves" to
those related to life contingencies. Reserves to provide for matured or accrued
liabilities to meet fixed obligations such as to pay fixed sums of money for stated
periods, reserves to pay deferred dividends, and reserves to provide for con-
tingencies such as capital losses, extraordinary operating expenses, etc., are not
"reserves" within the meaning of the law.39 Nevertheless, these things must be
accounted for and a burdensome tax might undermine the companies' soundness.
Once the life insurance business becomes unstable, the Treasury Department
and Congress will have defeated their purposes.
THE YOUTH COURT ACT
It has long been recognized in New York that a child under the age of seven
years is legally incapable of committing a crime1 and that one between the ages
of seven and twelve enjoys a presumption that he, too, is similarly incapable?
Even if this presumption is rebutted, a youth up to the age of sixteen, who is
accused of what would ordinarily be deemed a crime, may only be adjudged a
juvenile delinquent.3 If the youth is fifteen or over and has committed a crime
punishable by death or life inmprisonment, he is treated as an adult unless the
proceedings are ordered removed to the juvenile courts.4 Because the proceed-
ings in these cases differ radically from those strictly criminal, children's courts
were established as their particular forum where rigid rules of procedure could
be relaxed. Despite agitation to extend rehabilitative treatment to youths
sixteen and older, little was done until 1940 when the American Law Institute
adopted its Youth Correction Authority Act.? This act, intended as a model,
established a Youth Correction Authority to which persons under twenty-one
who had been convicted of a crime could be sentenced.0 It was to be the duty
of this Authority to expose the youth to those rehabilitative measures which the
Authority, aided by investigation reports and recommendations, considered best
suited to cope with the particular youth's problem. From available statistics it
was concluded that existing methods were failing when applied to youths,
39. The basic principles underlying the definition of the term "relerve funds" are those
stated by the United States Supreme Court in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Edwards, 271 U.S.
109 (1926) ; Maryland Cas. Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 342 (1920) ; McCoach v. Insurance
Co., 244 U.S. 585 (1917).
1. N.Y. Penal Law § 816.
2. N.Y. Penal Law § 817.
3. N.Y. Penal Law § 2186.
4. Ibid.
5. See Waite, The Youth Correction Authority Act, 9 Law & Contemp. Prob. COO (1942).
6. Id. at 604.
7. Id. at 602.
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which fact led one author to comment, "... the younger the person was at first
conviction the greater was the likelihood that he would again come into con-
flict with the law within a few years. This evidence again points to the in-
escapable conclusion that the best and most purposive penal and correctional
treatment must be designed for youthful offenders, since they present the
greatest risks."8 In justification of the approach proposed by the American Law
Institute it was argued that, "to the extent that the proposed Correction Act
departs from harshness of method, it does so not because harshness is cruel, but
because mildness is more effective." Most objectionable of the faults found
in the then existing method of disposing of youths convicted of crime were
that there were too many agencies handling the youth, that he was often de-
tained with hardened criminals and that rehabilitative processes were inade-
quate. 10 It was felt that by sentencing youths to the Authority immediately
upon conviction these hazards would be avoided and more individualized treat-
ment would be substituted. Along with its proposed Youth Correction Authority
Act the American Law Institute drafted a model act to establish youth courts
for metropolitan and large urban centers." Designed to eliminate delay and
improve conditions under which youths were detained, its age jurisdiction was
to be concurrent with that of the Authority. This proposal was criticized for
retaining too many features of a criminal proceeding and failing to extend its
benefits to all the youth of the state.1 2 California was the first state to enact
into its laws the substance of the Youth Correction Authority Act and several
others, in varying degree, have done so also.13
Reaction in New York came in 1942 when the report of a Joint Legislative
Committee formally proposed the establishment of a Youth Court to be a
division of the Domestic Relations Court of New York City and elsewhere
in the state as a part of the Children's Court.14 Its jurisdiction would cover
the sixteen, seventeen and eighteen year age group and the benefits of its
procedure would extend to those whom the c)urt considered capable of re-
habilitation. Many of the features contained in the model acts of the American
Law Institute were incorporated in the Committee's proposal'5 and further con-
sideration of the Youth Correction Authority Act was recommended,' 0 but the
Institute's Youth Court plan was rejected primarily because it confined its
jurisdiction to metropolitan and large urban centers. 17 Within the Commit-
tee's proposal were to be found the seeds of the present Youth Court Act. The
purposes of the two are identical and the measures adopted to achieve these
8. SelIen, Youth and Crime, 9 Law & Contemp. Prob. 585 (1942).
9. Waite, op. cit. supra note 6, at 603.
10. MacCormick, Existing Provisions for the Correction of Youthful Offenders, 9 Law
& Contemp. Prob. 589 (1942).
11. Alper, Youth Courts: Existing and Proposed, 9 Law & Contemp. Prob. 741 (1942).
12. Id. at 742.
13. See 21 U. Kan. City L. Rev. 184 (1952-53) for a comparison of these statutes.
14. N.Y. Legislative Document No. 55 at 14 (1942).
15. Id. at 293.
16. Id. at 284.
17. Id. at 293.
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ends are substantially similar. It was even suggested, but for pragmatic reasons,
that the proposed Youth Court and the existing Children's Court might be
merged into a single "Minor's Court."' 8 To support the entire recommendation
it was said that, "the Committee believes that by giving legislative sanction
to a system of youth courts to deal with the offender who is sixteen, seventeen
and eighteen years old, the same ends will be attained, and a socialized proce-
dure introduced which will accomplish more than would be achieved by simply
adding one, or at most two, years to the jurisdiction of our children's courts.
Furthermore, the way is clear for the eventual addition of the nineteenth and
twentieth years to the jurisdiction of these youth courts."19
The following year, 1943, the legislature enacted the Youthful Offender
Law. Although it did not establish the new and independent court requested
by the Committee, it did provide for specialized treatment of youths sixteen,
seventeen and eighteen years of age. Originally constituting sections 252-a
to 252-h of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure, the law was repealed
and reenacted in 1944 as sections 913-e through 913-r of the Code. The purpose
of the law was to provide a method that would be rehabilitative rather than
punitive, and would be made available to youths with no prior record of felony
conviction who were accused of crimes not requiring punishment by death or
life imprisonment.20 By its provisions a youth could be charged and adjudi-
cated a youthful offender in private proceedings, 2 ' and be subjected to the re-
habilitative measures prescribed.22 The bare minimum of formal criminal pro-
cedure was retained, primarily to safeguard the rights of the accused and to
insure to him a just disposition of his case. Finally, though correctional meas-
ures had been taken against him, a youth adjudicated a youthful offender was
not deemed to have committed a crime nor was his adjudication to be called a
conviction.m Thus, his right to public employment and to hold public office
were preserved and the stigma of a criminal record avoided.
This was the status of the law when, in 1955, the Temporary Commission
on the Courts in its report to the Governor and the legislature recommended
the Youth Court Act.2 4 Considering the experiment of 1943 a success, the
Commission proposed to extend the application of the Youthful Offender Law,
obviate some of its defects and, in general, clarify its provisions?3 It would
establish ". . . one court of first and final instance .... ,,27 to administer
youthful offender treatment to deserving youths in the sixteen to twenty-one
year age bracket. The Commission based its decision to include this group
on the general agreement of criminal court judges, district attorneys, and proba-
18. Id. at 279.
19. Id. at 39-40.
20. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 913-e.
21. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 913-k.
22. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 913-m.
23. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 913-n.
24. 1955 Report of the Temporary Commission on the Courts 77.
25. Id. at 83.
26. Ibid.
27. Id. at 82.
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tion officers that there are youths in that age bracket capable of rehabilitation.
"The law has traditionally considered youths under 21 as infants and we believe
there is sufficient psychological data to support the conclusion that most 19 and
20 year olds have not reached the level of adult maturity. s2 8 Aside from its
determination to extend the existing law, the Commission objected that there
were too many courts dealing with youth which led in turn to inconsistent
dispositions of their cases, delay, and the diffusion of responsibility.2 9 The
establishment of a Youth Court, it was felt, would fix responsibility in one
court and guarantee a more consistent application of the law. To eliminate un-
due delay which tends to thwart efforts to rehabilitate, the act reduces the
necessity of transferring cases to other courts and minimizes the role of the
grand jury. 0
In commenting on its proposal the Commission said, "under the present law,
a youth is treated as an adult criminal until such time as the judge is con-
vinced that he deserves special treatment. Under the recommended procedure,
the presumption is in -favor of the youth being treated as a Youthful Offender
until such, evidence is produced to the contrary."'3 The proposal was not sub-
mitted as a formal bill nor did the Commission urge its adoption in 1955. In
1956, however, apparently satisfied that the proper auxiliary facilities necessary
to best effectuate rehabilitation had been established,82 the Commission formally
proposed the Youth Court Act. The act, as passed, is the essence of this pro-
posal and, though it repeals the Youthful Offender Law, 3 the provisions of
the latter are substantially embodied in it.84
Provisions of the Youth Court Act
'he Youth Court, as a division of the highest criminal trial court of the state,
has exclusive original jurisdiction over youths between the ages of sixteen
and twenty-one charged with a crime or the offenses of disorderly conduct, va-
grancy or of being a disorderly person.85 It retains this exclusive jurisdiction
over all proceedings leading to the adjudication of a youth as a youthful offender,
a wayward minor or an adolescent drug user.8 6
Thus, upon apprehension, a youth of proper age must be brought to the
Youth Court. There he is advised of his rights to counsel, to communicate with
friends and of the purpose of the Youth Court. 7 He retains, at all times prior
to trial, the right to waive youthful offender treatment and to demand to be
28. Id. at 101.
29. Id. at 81.
30. Id. at 86.
31. Id. at 109.
32. 1956 Report of the Temporary Commission on the Courts 29.
33. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1956, c. 838, § 61.
34. McKinney's Sess. Laws 1100 (Note) (1956).
35. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1956, c. 838, § 11(a).
36. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1956, c. 838, § 11(b). § 11(c) permits the court to retain juris-
diction where the youth pleads guilty to a non-indictable crime or any of the specified
offenses.
37. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1956, c. 838, § 34.
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dealt with as an adult.38 In any case, the youth must consent to summary trial,
physical and mental examinations and investigation by a probation officer-9
Any youth, sixteen or seventeen, who has no prior record of felony conviction
and is not charged with a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment may
now be treated as a youthful offender.40 In its original proposal the Commis-
sion had recommended that this be a mandatory provision, but conceding the
objection that this would be too inflexible, its final bill permitted denial of
youthful offender treatment to such youths upon written certification by the
court.41 It is further provided that youths sixteen and seventeen who have a
prior record of felony conviction may, in the discretion of the court, be treated
as youthful offenders,4 2 a similar provision being made for those eighteen, nine-
teen and twenty where there is no disabling prior record. 3 The difference be-
tween these two latter provisions is that in the former, the youth is apprehended,
in the first instance, as a youthful offender and no criminal charge is made
until such time as he is determined ineligible; while in the latter, upon the
approval of the youth for special treatment, the existing criminal charge is
dropped and that of youthful offender is substituted. 4" Application of the new
law to those eighteen, nineteen and twenty year olds who have a prior record
of felony conviction is flatly rejected.45 If the act charged would constitute
an indictable crime the youth may demand that his case be submitted to the
grand jury and a finding in his favor by that body must result in release.A3 Upon
an adverse finding the court would resume the suspended process of determining
the youth's eligibility for youthful offender treatment.47 If any youth be deter-
mined eligible and gives the necessary consent he is charged with being a youth-
ful offender and is required to plead.48 A plea of guilty or a finding to that
effect after summary trial results in an adjudication of youthful offender. A
youth so adjudicated may receive a suspended sentence, have sentence imposed
and execution suspended or be committed. 0 Commitment would be to an au-
thorized religious, charitable or public institution for an indefinite period up
to three years which could, under certain conditions,5' be extended to five years.
If not committed, the youth could be placed on probation for a similar term.
Again, an adjudication of youthful offender is not deemed a conviction of
crime52 but provision is made for certification by the court that the acts
38. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1956, c. 838, § 50(4).
39. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1956, c. 838, § 50(2).
40. Ibid.
41. 1955 Report of the Temporary Commission on the Courts 107.
42. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1956, c. 838, § 50(3).
43. Ibid.
44. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1956, c. 838, § 32.
45. 1955 Report of the Temporary Commission on the Courts 102.
46. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1956, c. 838, §§ 51(1)-(2).
47. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1956, c. 838, § 51(3).
48. Ibid.
49. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1956, c. 838, § 53.
50. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1956, c. 838, § 56.
51. Ibid.
52. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1956, c. 838, § 57.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
committed constitute a felony where the circumstances warrant the additional
opprobrium. 53 This certification is considered to have the same disqualifying
effect in subsequent youthful offender proceedings as a felony record. The pro-
ceedings are to be conducted in private 54 and all records are to be kept con-
fidential.55 The assistance of the probationary and auxiliary services now avail-
able to existing criminal courts will be at the disposal of the new court 0 as will
an advisory committee consisting of prominent figures concerned with enforce-
ment of the criminal law.57 It is to be anticipated that these facilities will prove
to be of great assistance to the court in the exercise of the critical discretion
vested in it.
Conclusion
Increasing alarm over the volume of cases involving youths accused of crimes
has invited the attention and study of criminologists, jurists and interested
laymen throughout the world. All seem to agree that time honored methods
of punishment have not effectively solved the problem and the accent is now on
rehabilitation. After a few cautious steps in this area of social legislation, New
York has now taken a long stride in the enactment of the Youth Court Act. 8
Several of the experimental measures have been absorbed into it, such as the
Wayward Minors Act, while others, because of the peculiar problems they deal
with, remain undisturbed. Responsibility for youths under its jurisdiction is
now centered in one court from apprehension to commitment. In capable hands
the plan can work great good but, as has already been cautioned, unless ade-
quate and qualified personnel are available the system is doomed.50 New York
has taken an affirmative position in an effort to meet the problem; whether or
not it is the correct one remains to be seen.
53. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1956, c. 838, § 54.
54. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1956, c. 838, § 14.
55. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1956, c. 838, § 21.
56. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1956, c. 838, § 15.
57. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1956, c. 838, § 24.
58. As originally enacted, the Youth Court Act was to become effective February 1,
1957. On January 29, 1957, the New York State Legislature passed and sent to the Gov-
ernor a bill delaying the date to April 1, 1958. New York Herald Tribune, January 30,
1957, § 2, p. 1, col. 6.
59. Lamkin, The Treatment of Young Offenders in Continental Europe, 9 Law & Con-
temp. Prob. 759 (1942).
